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PERSONAL TORTS WITHIN THE FAMILY
VAL SANFORD*

I. INTRODUCTION
If a person, while under the influence of intoxicants, drives his automobile at excessive speed, loses control of it, jumps the curb and
strikes a pedestrian, injuring him severely, there would be little question, nothing else appearing, that he would be liable to the injured
pedestrian in an action for damages.
The premises underlying a conclusion of liability in such cases are
obvious. It is in the interest of society that injured persons be compensated and rehabilitated; and our conceptions of justice are such
that ordinarily it seems fair that the party who was at fault, whose
action caused the injury, should pay. It is also in the interest of
society that rules of conduct be established so that men may know
what actions are permissible and what are not; and so that injuries
such as those suffered by our pedestrian may be prevented.
These social interests are crystalized and expressed in several ways,
but primarily in the law of torts.
With the urbanization and mechanization of our environment these
social interests have become increasingly important, and the law of
torts has undergone a tremendous expansion. So much so that it can
fairly be said that "by and large except where one has suffered from
one's own fault or from an 'unavoidable accident' the law of torts
steps in today to offer some form of relief."'
Yet in many states, if our pedestrian were the spouse or child of
our drunken driver, the law of torts would offer no relief. The basis
of the conclusion that there is no liability for torts committed by one
against his spouse or child lies largely in the historical conception of
the family as a legal and social institution. The family was considered
a unit of government, with the husband and father as its head. Husband and wife were one in the eyes of the law, and the husband was
the one. Children could have few interests beyond the complete
dominion and control of their parents. With such a conception, even
aside from the rules of the law which were developed to implement it,
it was unthinkable that one spouse should be allowed to recover from
the other for personal tort, or that a child should recover from its
parent.
But the same urbanization and mechanization of our environment
which has made increasingly important the social interests under* Lecturer in law, Vanderbilt Law School; member, Tennessee Bar.
1. SEAvWY, COGITATioNS ON TORTS 4 (1954).
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lying the law of torts, has also hastened, if not caused, a great change
in the conception of the family as a legal and social institution. The
husband and father is no longer a tyrant to be feared and obeyed, but
a partner and a pal, or even a Dagwood Bumstead. Married women
are emancipated and can hold property, contract, vote, sue and be
sued, and otherwise participate in the affairs of the community free
from the legal domination of their husbands. Divorce is easier to
obtain and more socially acceptable.
Children too, no longer are so completely dependent upon and subject to the control of their parents. The state and other institutions of
society provide much of their education, recreation, and opportunities
for employment.
The increased importance of and emphasis upon the basic social
interests underlying the law of torts and the change in the conception
of the family as a legal and social institution have led many persons
and some courts to castigate the rule of no-liability for personal torts
between husband and wife or parent and child as vestigial and
anachronous.
Indeed, there have been many cases where the application of the
rule has resulted in manifest injustice.
Nevertheless, there are vital social interests in the family relationship which must be considered in the formulation of rules of law
with respect to torts committed by one member of the family against
another. The family group, husband and wife and minor children,
customarily live in the same house, are supported by and benefited
from the same sources of income, and have common interests. Parents
are responsible for the discipline of their children; and as natural
guardians and custodians, parents direct the use and disposition of
their children's property. The family is still a vital social institution.
Society has an interest in the protection of the family relation and in
that attitude of togetherness which is fundamental to family existence.
There are situations where there is at least an apparent conflict
between those social interests basic to the law of personal torts and
the social interests in the protection and preservation of the family
relationship. In any event in the formulation of a rule of law both
should be considered, and, insofar as is possible, both should be
secured.
II. THE PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW

While the same basic interests are involved in torts between husband and wife and those between parent and child, the rules themselves have developed in greatly different ways. It is therefore
expedient to follow the traditional classification and treat the two
separately.
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A. Husbandand Wife
The Common-Law Rule.--It was impossible at common law for one
spouse ever to be liable to another in damages for an act which would
have been tortious had the marital relation not existed, regardless
of the nature of the tort or whether it arose before or during coverture.
In theory, the difficulty was both substantive and procedural-substantive, in that the right and duty could not arise or would merge
in the husband-procedural, in that during coverture the husband
would be both plaintiff and defendant. In fact, it was simply unthinkable in view of the common-law conception of the marital relation for
such a right of action to exist.
The rule, however, owed its origin and its continued vitality not
so much to a conscious effort to express a social policy as to the varied
influences of passages of Scripture, medieval metaphysics and conceptions of natural law, Roman law, feudalism and the sheer weight
of judicial precedent.
1. Wife v. Husband
a. The Married Women's Emancipation Acts.-During the course
of the past century the various state legislatures, under the pressures
of our changing environment, changing social theories and philosophies
and the feminist movement, enacted Married Women's Emancipation
Acts. As their name implies, the general purpose of these acts was
to remove from married women the disabilities of coverture and thus
to emancipate them so that they might stand as equals with their
husbands in the eyes of the law and contract, hold property, sue and
be sued as individuals in their own right.
These statutes vary considerably in their terminology. Some of the
earlier statutes were expressly concerned only with property rights,
and thus could not reasonably be construed as affecting the right of
one spouse to sue the other for personal torts.
In at least one jurisdiction-Illinois-a statute has been enacted expressly providing that neither spouse may sue the other for a tort
2
In Louisiana a
against the person committed during coverture
statute which in general terms bars married women from suing their
husbands during coverture except for certain divorce and property
actions has been construed as barring a suit for personal injuries during coverture. 3 In New York, on the other hand, a statute
2. ILL. REV. STAT. c. 68, § 1 (1953); Hindman v. Holmes, 4 Ill. App. 2d 279,
124 N.E.2d 344 (1955). In the case of Brandt v. Keller, 413 Ill. 503, 109
N.E.2d 729 (1952), the Illinois court held that a wife could sue her husband
for injuries sustained by her as a result of her husband's driving his automobile in a wilful and wanton manner. The statute was thus apparently passed
for the express purpose of changing the rule therein announced.
3. Edwards v. Royal Indemnity Co., 182 La. 171, 161 So. 191 (1935); Palmer
v. Edwards. 155 So. 483 (La. App. 1934). But cf. Gremilion v. Caffey,
71 So. 2d 670 (La. App. 1954) (wife, after her divorce, was allowed to
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expressly allows one spouse to sue the other for personal injuries. 4
In a great majority of the states, however, the statutes have no
express provisions with respect to such actions, but rather provide
in general language that married women may sue separately for torts

committed against them and generally that they may sue and be sued
as though they were unmarried.5 In most of these states, the courts
have held that such statutes do not so change the common law so
as to allow actions between spouses for personal torts.6 In a substantial minority, however, a contrary result has been reached. 7
The immediate problem is thus primarily a matter of statutory
construction. While in a few cases the decisions have turned upon
some specific language in the particular statute, on the whole the
decisions have been based upon general principles of statutory construction considered in the light of the social theories and interests
involved.
On the one hand, in arriving at the conclusion that these statutes
do not authorize one spouse to sue another for personal torts, the
courts have said:
(1) In enacting such statutes the legislatures intended merely
to remove the limitations upon a wife's right of action requiring
that she be joined by her husband and to allow the wife to sue
maintain an action for an assault committed by her former husband before
the divorce).
4. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 57.
5. See Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 632, 651 (1955).
6. Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910); Peters v. Peters, 156 Cal.
32, 103 Pac. 219 (1909); Ferguson v. Davis, 102 A.2d 707 (Del. 1954); Webster
v. Schneider, 103 Fla. 1131, 138 So. 755 (1932); Wright v. Wright, 85 Ga. App.
721, 70 S.E.2d 152 (1952); Blickenstaff v. Blickenstaff, 89 Ind. App. 529, 167 N.E.
146 (1929); Libby v. Berry, 74 Me. 286, 589 (1883); Furstenburg v. Furstenburg,
152 Md. 247, 136 Atl. 534 (1927); Lubowitz v. Taines, 293 Mass. 39, 198 N.E.
320 (1935); Harvey v. Harvey, 239 Mich. 142, 214 N.W. 305 (1927); Patenaude
v. Patenaude, 195 Minn. 523, 263 N.W. 546 (1935); Austin v. Austin, 136
Miss. 61, 100 So. 591 (1924); Willott v. Willott, 333 Mo. 896, 62 S.W.2d 1084
(1933); Conley v. Conley, 92 Mont. 425, 15 P.2d 922 (1932); Emerson v. Western
Seed & Irrig. Co., 116 Neb. 180, 216 N.W. 297 (1927); Hudson v. Gas Consumers' Ass'n, 123 N.J.L. 252, 8 A.2d 337 (1939); Romero v. Romero, 58 N.M. 201,
269 P.2d 748 (1954); Oken v. Oken, 44 R.I. 291, 117 Atl. 357 (1922); Lillienkamp
v. Rippetoe, 133 Tenn. 57, 179 S.W. 628 (1915); Comstock v. Comstock, 106
Vt. 50, 169 Atl. 903 (1934); Keister v. Keister, 123 Va. 157, 96 S.E. 315 (1918);
Schultz v. Christopher, 65 Wash. 496, 118 Pac. 629 (1911); Poling v. Poling,
116 W. Va. 187, 179 S.E. 604 (1935); McKinney v. McKinney, 59 Wyo. 204, 135
P.2d 940 (1943).
7. Johnson v. Johnson, 201 Ala. 41, 77 So. 335 (1917); Katzenberg v. Katzenberg, 183 Ark. 626, 37 S.W.2d 696 (1931); Rains v. Rains 97 Colo. 19, 46 P.2d
740 (1935); Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 Atl. 889 (191); Lorang v. Hays 69
Idaho 440, 209 P.2d 733 (1949); Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1953);
Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Blake, 94 N.H. 141, 47 A.2d 874 (1946); Coster
v. Coster, 289 N.Y. 438, 46 N.E.2d 509 (1943); Fitzmaurice v. Fitzmaurice,
62 N.D. 191, 242 N.W. 526 (1932); Damm v. Elyria Lodge, 158 Ohio St. 107,
107 N.E.2d 337 (1952); Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P.2d 660 (1938);
Pardue v. Pardue, 167 S.C. 129, 166 S.E. 101 (1932); Scotvold v. Scotvold, 68
S.D. 53, 298 N.W. 266 (1941); Taylor v. Patten, 2 Utah 2d 404, 275 P.2d 696
(1954); Wait v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202, 209 N.W. 475 (1926).

1956 ]

PERSONAL TORTS WITHIN THE FAMILY

in her own name; and hence there was no intention to change the
substantive law by creating new causes of action in married
women where none existed before, as would be the case in personal
torts between spouses. 8
(2) In enacting such statutes, the legislatures intended to affect
only contract or property rights and not to change the fundamental
nature of the marital relationship so as to allow actions between
spouses for personal torts.9
(3) The purpose of such statutes was to place married women on
a plane of equality with their husbands; and since a husband could
not sue his wife for personal torts, equality or mutuality requires
that the wife should not be able to sue him.10
(4) Statutes in derogation of common law must be construed
as not altering the common law further than expressly declared or
necessarily implied from the fact that they cover the entire subject
matter. Actions between spouses for personal torts are not expressly
provided for in The Married Women's Emancipation Acts, nor is
their authorization necessarily implied."
On the other hand, in arriving at the conclusion that The Married
Woman's Emancipation Acts do authorize actions between spouses for
personal torts the courts have said:
(1) Such statutes have the purpose and effect of destroying the
fiction of the legal identity of husband and wife, and thus of de2
stroying the reason for and the foundation of the common-law rule.
(2) Words in statutes should be given their plain and ordinary
meaning, and when the legislature provided without limitation
that married women might bring actions as if sole, it meant that they
might bring such actions against any person who did them injury,
8. Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910); Furstenberg v. Furstenberg,
152 Md. 247, 136 Atl. 534 (1927); Austin v. Austin, 136 Miss. 61, 100 So. 591
(1934); Libby v. Berry, 74 Me. 286 (1883); Conley v. Conley, 92 Mont. 425, 15
P.2d 922 (1932); Romero v. Romero, 58 N.M. 201, 269 P.2d 748 (1954); Comstock v. Comstock, 106 Vt. 50, 169 Atl. 903 (1934).
9. Peters v. Peters, 156 Cal. 32, 103 Pac. 219 (1909); Corren v. Corren, 47
So. 2d 774 (Fla. 1950); Henneger v. Lomas, 145 Ind. 287, 44 N.E. 462 (1896);
Conley v. Conley, 92 Mont. 425, 15 P.2d 922 (1932); Oken v. Oken, 44 R.I. 291,
117 Atl. 357 (1922).
10. Strom v. Strom, 98 Minn. 427, 107 N.W. 1047 (1906); Austin v. Austin,
136 Miss. 61, 100 So. 591 (1924); Rogers v. Rogers, 265 Mo. 200, 177 S.W. 382

(1915); Conley v. Conley, 92 Mont. 425, 15 P.2d 922 (1932); Smith v. Smith,
287 P.2d 572 (Ore. 1955); Schultz v. Christopher, 65 Wash. 496, 118 Pac. 629
(1911).
11. Lillienkamp v. Rippetoe, 133 Tenn. 57, 179 S.W. 628 (1915); Keister v.
Keister, 123 Va. 157, 96 S.E. 315 (1918); Poling v. Poling, 116 W. Va. 187,
179 S.E. 604 (1935).

12. Johnson v. Johnson, 201 Ala. 41, 77 So. 335 (1917); Katzenberg v.
Katzenberg, 183 Ark. 626, 37 S.W.2d 696 (1931); Rains v. Rains, 97 Colo. 19,

46 P.2d 740 (1935); Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 Atl. 889 (1914); Brown
v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1953).
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including their husbands.' 3
(3) The effect of such statutes was to do more than merely put
married women on a plane of equality with their husbands. It
also gave them by its terms the same rights and position as un14
married women.
(4) Such statutes are remedial in character and thus should be
5
liberally construed.'
(5) By authorizing actions by married women alone when the
action concerned their separate property, the legislature authorized
married women to sue their husbands for personal torts, since married women have a right in their persons, and a suit for a wrong
to their persons is a chose in action and a chose in action is prop16
erty.
(6) It is illogical to assume that the legislature intended to allow
married women to sue for torts against their property, but not
17
against their person.
b. Policy Considerations.-The courts have, however, generally recognized the problem as one of social policy.
In support of the view that no action for personal torts between
spouses should be allowed, the courts have said that:
(1) To allow such actions would be to encourage and incite the
disruption of that marital harmony and domestic peace which is essential to the preservation and protection of the institution of the
family. 18
(2) To allow such actions would be to encourage baseless and
trivial actions brought out of spite rather than from merit; 19 and
where the defendant was protected by insurance the allowance of
20
such actions would encourage collusion and fraud.
(3) The laws of crimes and of divorce afford married persons
sufficient and adequate remedies for such wrongs, and are sufficient
21
to protect society's interest in their prevention.
13. Gilman v. Gilman, 78 N.H. 4, 95 AtI. 657 (1915); Wait v. Pierce, 191 Wis.
N.W. 475 (1926).
14. Fitzmaurice v. Fitzmaurice, 62 N.D. 191, 242 N.W. 526 (1932).

202, 209

15. Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P.2d 660 (1938).
16. Prosser v. Prosser, 114 S.C. 45, 102 S.E. 787 (1920).
17. Scotvold v. Scotvold, 68 S.D. 53, 298 N.W. 266 (1941).
18. Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910); Corren v. Corren, 47 So.
2d 774 (Fla. 1950); Sink v. Sink, 172 Kan. 217, 239 P.2d 933 (1952); Austin v.
Austin, 136 Miss. 61, 100 So. 591 (1924); Lillienkamp v. Rippetoe, 133 Tenn.
57, 179 S.W. 628 (1915).
19. Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910).
20. Lubowitz v. Taines, 293 Mass. 39, 198 N.E. 320 (1935); Harvey v. Harvey,
239 Mich. 142, 214 N.W. 305 (1927); Smith v. Smith, 287 P.2d 572 (Ore. 1955).
21. Peters v. Peters, 156 Cal. 32, 103 Pac. 219 (1909); Drake v. Drake, 145
Minn. 388, 177 N.W. 624 (1920); Austin v. Austin, 136 Miss. 61, 100 So. 591
(1924).
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(4) Money recovered in such actions would go into the family
exchequer and would be available for family purposes to both
parties.P
(5) The policies invoked are so confused, and the difficulty of
devising a satisfactory23rule is so great that the matter should be
left to the legislatures.
On the other hand, in support of the view that such actions should
be permitted, the courts have said:
(1) The remedies through divorce and criminal procedures do
not afford adequate redress and thus if there be24 no recovery in
tort the injured spouse has no adequate remedy.
(2) The bringing of such actions will not disrupt domestic
harmony; but rather where such actions are brought, that harmony
has already been disrupted. 25
(3) Spouses can bring other actions against one another including
tort actions involving property. There is no sound reason to make
a distinction with respect to personal torts. 26
c. Type of Tort and Presence of Insurance.-The rule of no-liability
has been applied in cases involving assault, negligence, malicious prosecution and other torts.27 At least one court has expressly held that
the rule of no-liability applied regardless of whether the claim was
based upon mere negligence or willful, wanton or malicious conduct.28 However, in a recent Oregon case the court held, "We hold that
when a husband inflicts intentional harm upon the person of his
wife, the peace and harmony of the home has been so damaged that
there is no danger that it will be further impaired by the maintenance
' 29
of an action for damages and she may maintain an action.
The great majority of the cases have been actions by the wife
against the husband for injuries resulting from the negligent operation of an automobile.30 In most cases, no doubt, the husband carried
liability insurance. But the presence of such insurance has not led the
22. Austin v. Austin, 136 Miss. 61, 100 So. 591 (1924); Smith v. Smith, 287
P.2d 572 (Ore. 1955).
23. Smith v. Smith, 287 P.2d 572 (Ore. 1955).
24. Johnson v. Johnson, 201 Ala. 41, 77 So. 335 (1917).
25. Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 AtI. 889 (1914); Lorang v. Hayes, 69
Idaho 440, 209 P.2d 773 (1949); Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1953);
Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P.2d 660 (1938); Scotvold v. Scotvold,
68 S.D. 53, 298 N.W. 266 (1941); Wait v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202, 209 N.W. 475
(1926).
26. Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1953); Courtney v. Courtney,
184 Okla. 395, 87 P.2d 660 (1938).
27. See Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 632, 636 (1955).
28. Wright v. Wright, 85 Ga. App. 721, 70 S.E.2d 152 (1952).
29. Apitz v. Dames, 287 P.2d 585, 598 (Ore. 1955); Smith v. Smith, 287
P.2d 572 (Ore. 1955).
30. See Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 632, 636 (1955).
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courts to deviate from the rule of disability. In some cases, however,

the courts have advanced as an additional reason for retaining the
rule of no-liability the belief that the allowance of such actions would
encourage collusive suits where the defendant was protected by insurance.3' Courts adopting the rule that such actions can be maintained have said that there is no more danger of collusion in such
cases than in numerous others and that such a contention is no basis

32
for denying liability.
d. Premarital Torts.-In those states where the rule of spousal
disability is still applied, the courts have generally held that the
rule is applicable to premarital torts as well as to those committed
during marriage; 33 the rationale of the decisions being substantially the
same as those set forth above with respect to wrongs committed during coverture. Some courts have indicated that the difficulty is not
merely procedural but substantive, holding that the unity arising
from marriage extinguishes any right of action theretofore existing.M
In North Carolina, however, the rule of disability has been held inapplicable to a premarital tort on the theory that a woman's liability
for torts was not affected by marriage under the language of the applicable statute.35 In a recent Missouri case, it was also held that
a wife could maintain an action against her husband for a personal
tort arising out of an automobile accident which occurred prior to
the marriage, even though the action was brought after marriage.6
e. Effect of Invalidity of Marriage or Annulment.-In an Indiana
case, the court held in an action for premarital seduction that when
the marriage was shown to be invalid the rule of spousal disability was
not applicable so that the wife could bring such an action against her
husband. 37- In at least two other cases, however, the courts have held
that the fact that a marriage had been annuled did not affect the rule
prohibiting actions between spouses arising during coverture.38

31. Lubowitz v. Taines, 293 Mass. 39, 198 N.E. 320 (1935); Harvey v. Harvey,
239 Mich. 142, 214 N.W. 305 (1927).
32. Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P.2d 660 (1938).
33. Bohenek v. Niedzwiechi, 142 Conn. 278, 113 A.2d 509 (1955), (applying
Pennsylvania law); Carmichael v. Carmichael, 53 Ga. App. 663, 187 S.E. 116
(1936) ; Hunter v. Livingston, 123 N.E.2d 912 (Ind. App. 1955); Patenaude v.
Patenaude, 195 Minn. 523, 263 N.W. 546 (1935); Scales v. Scales, 168 Miss.
439, 151 So. 551 (1934); Wolfer v. Oehlers, 8 N.J. Super. 434, 73 A.2d 95 (L.1950);
Raines v. Mercer, 165 Tenn. 415, 55 S.W.2d 263 (1932); Furey v. Furey, 193 Va.

727, 71 S.E.2d 191 (1952); Staats v. Co-operative Transit Co., 125 W. Va. 473,

24 S.E.2d 916 (1943).
34. E.g., Raines v. Mercer, 165 Tenn. 415, 55 S.W.2d 263 (1932).
35. Shirley v. Ayers, 201 N.C. 51, 158 S.E. 840 (1931) action by husband
against his wife for a personal tort). But cf. Scholtens v. Scholtens, 230 N.C.
149, 52 S.E.2d 350 (1949) (husband denied recovery from his wife for a
tort committed during coverture).
36. Hamilton v. Fulkerson, 285 S.W.2d 642 (Mo. 1955).
37. Henneger v. Lomas, 145 Ind. 287, 44 N.E. 462 (1896).
38. Lunt v. Lunt, 121 S.W.2d 445 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938); Callow v. Thomas,
322 Mass. 550, 78 N.E.2d 637 (1948), criticized in 48 CoLum. L. RMv. 961 (1948).
The Callow decision was based upon a, consideration of the general effect
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f. Effect of Divorce.--Clearly the rule of disability is inapplicable
to torts committed after the divorce becomes effective. Where a decree of divorce had been entered, but had not become final, a California court held that the marital bonds had not been severed so as to
make the rule of disability inapplicable. 39 However, it was held in
an analogous case in the District of Columbia that a wife could sue
her husband for a tort committed in the interim between the entry
of a decree for a divorce and its effective date. 40
As to torts committed during coverture, those courts following the
common-law rule have held that divorce of the parties does not affect
the applicability of the rule,41 the principal reason for such a result
being the theory that no cause of action arose during coverture, and
the fact that divorce could not create a cause of action when none
existed at the time the events occurred. In addition, the courts have
relied upon the contention that all matters between the parties were
settled by the divorce decree itself.
g. Trends and Tendencies.-There has been no appreciable tendency
on the part of either the courts which have adhered to the commonlaw rule of disability or those assuming a contrary position to depart
from their previous decisions. Nor have the courts which follow
the common-law rule shown any appreciable inclination to limit its
application. Only one case was found where the court expressly overruled its prior decisions in this regard.42 In that case the court overruled its prior decisions following the rule of disability and allowed
an action between spouses for a personal tort.
In only two instances have the legislatures changed the rule adopted
by the courts. In New York a statute was passed expressly allowing
such actions, 43 while in Illinois a statute was passed expressly barring
such action.44
In a few of the later cases, the courts have recognized the nature
of the problem and have attempted to formulate a rule which would
secure all the social interests involved, rather than adherring to either
of annulments, that is, that when the marriage is merely voidable, as was
the case there, the parties thereto will be barred from reopening or undoing
acts or transactions concluded during the marriage. Query, as to the result
in the case of a marriage prohibited by law and thus void.
39. Paulus v. Bauder, 106 Cal. App. 2d 589, 235 P.2d 422 (1951).
40. Steele v. Steele, 65 F. Supp. 329 (D.D.C. 1946).
41. Bandfield v. Bandfield, 117 Mich. 80, 75 N.W. 287 (1898); Strom v. Strom,
98 Minn. 427, 107 N.W. 1047 (1906); Schultz v. Christopher, 65 Wash. 496, 118
Pac. 629 (1911).

42. Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1953). See also Hamilton v.
Fulkerson, 285 S.W.2d 645 (Mo. 1955).
43. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW. § 57. At the same time the New York legislature
adopted this act, it enacted a statute providing that no insurance policy
should be deemed to insure against any liability of an insured for injuries
to his or her spouse unless express provision for such insurance was included in the policy. N.Y. INs. LAw § 167 (3).
44. ILL. REV. STAT. c. 68, § 1 (1953).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 9

the inflexible rule of disability or the equally inflexible rule of no
disability.4 5
2. Husband v. Wife
Most of the cases wherein one spouse has been allowed to maintain
an action against the other for personal tort, have been brought by
a wife against her husband. The courts have thus had little occasion
to consider whether a husband may maintain such an action against
his wife. As would be expected in those jurisdictions where the wife is
not allowed to sue her husband for personal tort, the husband has
not been allowed to sue his wife. 46 In North Carolina and Wisconsin,
where the courts have held that a wife may maintain such actions
against her husband, the courts have also held that husbands have
no such rights against their wives on the theory that the Married
Women's Emancipation Acts conferred no rights upon married men,
and thus that the common-law rule of spousal disability remained in
force as to married men. 47 One answer to the latter contention would
be that the statutes have destroyed the basis of the rule of disability
and that it should no longer be followed as to either spouse.
B. Parentand Child
1. Child v. Parent
Prior to 1891, there seems to have been no decision, either English
or American, directly on the point as to whether an unemancipated
child could maintain an action against its parent for personal tort.48
Some courts have reasoned that this absence of judicial decision supports the proposition that no such action was recognized at common
law.49 Others have reasoned that this absence shows rather that there
was no such rule at common law.50
In 1891, however, a Mississippi court held that an unemancipated
child could not bring an action for personal tort against its parent.5 1
The court said, "So long as the parent is under obligation to care for,
guide, and control, and the child is under reciprocal obligation to aid
and comfort and obey, no such action as this can be maintained. The
45. E.g., Apitz v. Dames, 287 P.2d 585 (Ore. 1955); Taylor v. Patten,
2 Utah 2d 404, 275 P.2d 696 (1954).
46. Peters v. Peters, 156 Cal. 32, 103 Pac. 219 (1909); Aldrich v. Tracy, 222
Iowa 84, 269 N.W. 30 (1936).
47. Scholtens v. Scholtens, 230 N.C. 149, 52 S.E.2d 350 (1949); Fehr v.
General Acc., Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 246 Wis. 228, 16 N.W.2d 787 (1944).
48. Three decisions involving actions by children against persons in loco
parentis are reported: Gould v. Christianson, Fed. Cas. No. 5636 (D.C.N.Y.
1836); Nelson v. Johansen, 18 Neb. 180, 24 N.W. 730 (1885); Lander v. Seaver,
32 Vt. 114 (1859). In all three cases some support for a rule of liability can
be found at least as to gross neglect or cruel and malicious acts.
49. Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R.I. 131, 131 Atl. 198 (1925).
50. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 Atl. 905 (1930).
51. Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
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peace of society, and of the families composing society, and of a sound
public policy designed to subserve the repose of families and the
best interests of society, forbid to the minor child a right to appear
in Court in the assertion of a claim to civil redress for personal injuries suffered at the hands of the parent. The state, through its criminal laws, will give the minor child protection for parental violence
and wrongdoing, and this is all the child can be heard to demand."
This decision was followed by the Supreme Court of Tennessee in
1903 in a case involving an action by a minor child against her father
and step-mother seeking to recover damages for cruel and inhuman
treatment alleged to have been inflicted upon her by the step-mother
at the instance and with the consent of the father.52
The same rule was also applied in a much-criticized Washington
case decided in 1905, where a daughter brought an action for damages
53
against her father as a result of his raping her.
On the basis of these decisions and the reasons advanced in support thereof, the great majority of the courts of this country have
held that minor children cannot maintain actions for personal torts
against their parents. 54 The basis of the rule is not that the parent is
under no duty with respect to his child, but rather that the child has
no right to bring a civil action against his parent for redress of such
injuries. 55
a. Policy Considerations.-Insupport of the rule barring an action
by a minor child against its parents, the courts have relied upon a
number of considerations of public policy.
Perhaps the most frequently cited, as well as the most often
criticized, conception has been the view that the allowance of such
actions would disturb the peace and harmony of the family which
56
is essential to a well-ordered society.
Another frequently cited conception of policy is the view that such
actions would impair parental authority. 57 Some courts have also
reasoned that the payment of damages to one member of the family
would be unfair to other members, since the sum awarded would come
from family funds which should be used for the benefit of all.58
52. McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903).

53. Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905), Contra, Borst v.
Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952).
54. See Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 423 (1951).
55. Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891); Dunlap v. Dunlap,
84 N.H. 352, 150 Atl. 905 (1930).
56. Chastain v. Chastain, 50 Ga. App. 241, 177 S.E. 828 (1934); Smith v.
Smith, 81 Ind.App. 566, 142 N.E. 128 (1924); Reingold v. Reingold, 115 N.J.L.
532, 181 Atl. 153 (1935); Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923);
McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903).
57. Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832, 114 S.W.2d 468 (1938); Mesite v. Kirchenstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 Atl. 753 (1929); Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79
Pac. 788 (1905); Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787 (1927).
58. E.g., Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905).
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Other courts have indicated that the child is adequately protected by
59
the criminal laws and by the writ of habeas corpus.
Where the parent has been protected by liability insurance some
courts have reasoned that to allow such actions would encourage
fraud and collusion. 60 Others have said that the conditions of family
life require that the parent be protected from actions arising out of
the discharge of his parental duties. 61 The difficulty in apportioning
any recovery so that the parent does not benefit from his own wrong
02
has also been mentioned in support of the denial of such actions.
The applicability and soundness of these various conceptions of
63
One
policy has been thoroughly analyzed on several occasions.
of
these
of the most thorough and well-reasoned judicial discussions
policies is that of the Supreme Court of Washington in the case of
Borst v. Borst,64 wherein the rule of disability was qualified and limited
so as to apply only to those torts arising out of the exercise of parental
duties.
b. Analogies to Actions Between Husband and Wife.-Some courts
in support of their decisions refusing to allow a minor child to sue
its parents have said that such actions are analogous to actions for personal torts between husband and wife and have reasoned that since
the latter cannot be maintained the same considerations of policy
should preclude the former.65 While it is true that the same considerations of policy are involved in both types of actions, it is
equally true that there are no historical rules of law involved in
the parent-child action analogous to the procedural and substantive
difficulties at common law upon which the rule of disability for
personal torts between spouses is based.
c. Effect of Additional Relationship.-The presence of some additional relationship between the parent and child, such as master and
servant, or carrier and passenger, or the fact that the tort arose out
of the business activities of the parent, has been a factor in leading
some courts to qualify the rule of disability. The theory underlying
such a position is that where the tort arises out of the additional relationship rather than out of the normal parent-child relationship,
the latter relation is merely incidental or irrelevant and thus should
not affect the question of liability. For example, in two cases where
a carrier-passenger relation existed between the parties, the courts
allowed the minor child-passenger to maintain an action against the
59. E.g., Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
60. E.g., Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
61. Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952).
62. Harralson v. Thomas, 269 S.W.2d 276 (Ky. 1954).
63. McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HArV. L. REV.
1030 (1930).
64. 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952).
65. Mesite v. Kirchenstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 Ati. 753 (1929); see e.g., McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W.2d 664 (1903).
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parent-carrier. 66 In these cases the courts recognized a distinction
between the parental obligation and the rights and duties involved
therein, and the general obligations which the law imposes upon
everyone in his relations with his fellows.
In the leading case of Dunlap v. Dunlap,67 one of the factors leading
the court to allow the maintenance of an action by a child against its
parent was the presence of a master-servant relation between the
parties. In that case the injury was sustained in the course of employment, and the court further found that by taking out a liability
insurance policy, the parent-master had intended to assume a master's
68
liability toward the child-servant.
In several cases involving actions for injuries to a child resulting
from the parent's negligent operation of the family automobile the
contention has been made that the breach of the duty in such cases
does not involve the parent-child relation, and that therefore the
action should be allowed. But such contentions have not been favorably received by the courts.69
In two well-reasoned recent cases, the courts held that since the
torts arose out of the business activities of the parent and not out
of the exercise of parental duties, the reasons suggesting the rule of
disability were not applicable and accordingly the actions were al70
lowed.
d. Effect of Insurance.-While in some cases the courts have held
that the act of a parent in obtaining a policy of insurance indicated
an intention to assume liability to the child in respect to the matters
covered by the policy,7 1 the courts have generally held that the presence of insurance does not create a liability where none would exist in
its absence.7 2
e. Effect of Characterof Tort.-The cases have almost unanimously
held, in the absence of some special circumstances, that an unemancipated child cannot recover against its parent in an action based on
66. Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939); Lusk v. Lusk,

113 W. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932).

67. 84 N.H. 352, 150 Atl. 905 (1930).
68. But cf. Taubert v. Taubert, 103 Minn. 247, 114 N.W. 763 (1908).
69. See, e.g., Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938). But cf.

Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950).

70. Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952); Borst v. Borst,
41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952). Contra, Belleson v. Skilbeck, 185 Minn.
537, 242 N.W. 1 (1932); Aboussie v. Aboussie, 270 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Civ. App.
1954).
71. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 Atl. 905 (1930); Worrell v. Worrell,
174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939); Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932).
72. Owens v. Auto Mut. Indem. Co., 235 Ala. 9, 177 So. 133 (1937); Rambo
v. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832, 114 S.W.2d 468 (1938); Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass.
480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938); Elias v. Collins, 237 Mich. 175, 211 N.W. 88 (1926);

Lund v. Olson, 183 Minn. 515, 237 N.W. 188 (1931); Reingold v. Reingold, 115
N.J.L. 532, 181 Atl. 153 (1935); Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12
(1923); Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952).
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negligence.7 3 However, where the action is based upon the parent's
intentional, or wilful and malicious misconduct some courts have
held that the action could be maintained, primarily on the theory that
by engaging in such misconduct the parent abandons the parental
relation.7 4 Such decisions have also emphasized that in such cases
the policy favoring family peace and harmony can have no application, since by his acts the parent has already destroyed that harmony.7 5
The courts have generally held that a child cannot recover damages
against its parent in actions arising out of the exercise by the parent
of his right to discipline or punish the child.76 Some courts have indicated, however, that when the parent abuses the child and his right
to discipline it, the child may maintain an action for damages resulting therefrom."7 Others have held that even if the punishment is
cruel and abusive a child cannot maintain an action for damages
78
against its parent.

f. Effect of Emancipation-There seems to be no question but
that an emancipated child can maintain an action for personal tort
against its parent.1 9 Some courts have indicated that the emancipation must be complete in order to remove the disability,80 that is,
73. Owens v. Auto Mut. Indem. Co., 235 Ala. 9, 177 So. 133 (1937); Rambo
v. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832, 114 S.W.2d 468 (1938); Trudell v. Leatherby, 212 Cal.
678, 300 Pac. 7 (1931); Wood v. Wood, 135 Conn. 280, 63 A.2d 586 (1948)
Bulloch v. Bulloch, 45 Ga. App. 1, 163 S.E. 708 (1932); Skillin v. Skiln, 136
Me. 223, 154 Atl. 570 (1931); Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438
(1938); Elias v. Collins, 237 Mich. 175, 211 N.W. 88 (1926); Lund v. Olson, 183
Minn. 515, 237 N.W. 188 (1931); Baker v. Baker, 263 S.W.2d 24 (Mo. 1953);
Reingold v. Reingold, 115 N.J.L. 532, 181 Atl. 153 (1935); Cannon v. Cannon,
287 N.Y. 425, 40 N.E.2d 236 (1942); Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E.

12 (1923); Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R.I. 131, 131 Atl. 198 (1925); Kelly v.
Kelly, 158 S.C. 517, 155 S.E. 888 (1930); Graham v. Miller, 182 Tenn. 434, 187
S.W. 2d 622 (1945); Norfolk S.R.R. v. Gretakis, 162 Va. 597, 174 S.E. 841 (1934) ;
Securo v. Securo, 110 W. Va. 1, 156 S.E. 750 (1931); Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260,

212 N.W. 787 (1927). But cf. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 Atl. 905
(1930); Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952); Worrell v.
Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939); Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251
P.2d 146 (1952); Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932).

74. Brown v. Cole, 198 Ark. 417, 129 S.W.2d 245 (1939); Emery v. Emery,
289 P.2d 218 (Cal. 1955); Wright v. Wright, 85 Ga. App. 721, 70 S.E.2d 152
(1952); Treschman v. Treschman, 28 Ind. App. 206, 61 N.E. 961 (1901); Nudd

v. Matsoukas, 131 N.E.2d 525 (Ill. 1956); Malnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77
A.2d 923 (1951); Dix v. Martin, 171 Mo. App. 266, 157 S.W. 133 (1913); Meyer
v. Ritterbush, 196 Misc. 551, 92 N.Y.S.2d 595 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Cowgill v. Boock,
189 Ore. 282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950).
75. See, e.g., Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951).
76. Chastain v. Chastain, 50 Ga. App. 241, 177 S.E. 828 (1934); Rowe v. Rugg,
117 Iowa 606, 91 N.W. 903 (1902); McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77
S.W. 664 (1903).
77. Treschman v. Treschman, 28 Ind. App. 206, 61 N.E. 961 (1901); Mahnke
v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150
Atl. 905 (1930); Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950).
78. McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903).
79. Mesite v. Kirchenstein, 109 Conn. 77, 145 Atl. 753 (1929); Bulloch v.
Bulloch, 45 Ga. App. 1, 163 S.E. 708 (1932); Skillin v. Skillin, 130 Me. 223 154
Atl. 570 (1931); Lancaster v. Lancaster, 213 Miss. 536, 57 So. 2d 302 (1952).
80. Shea v. Pettee, 19 Conn. Supp. 125, 110 A.2d 492 (Super. Ct. 1954).
Nudd v. Matsoukas, 6 Il1. App. 2d 504, 128 N.E.2d 609 (1955), rev'd, 7 Ill. 2d
608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956).
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that there must have been a complete severance of the "filial ties."'81
However, where the wrongful act on which the action is based occurred before emancipation, the courts have held that the right to
maintain the action must be determined as of the time of the wrongful act and that the fact of emancipation cannot create a right of
82
action when none existed at that time.
g. Waiver of Defense by Parent.-In at least two cases where
children brought suit against their parents in which the latter were
protected by liability insurance and defended by the insurance company, the parent sought to avoid the effect of the rule of disability by
attempting either to waive the defense itself or to waive any interest
in any recovery.83 In both cases, however, the courts held that the
rule was substantive in nature, and hence that no cause of action
existed and one could not be created by waiver.
h. Trends and Tendencies.-No case was found in which the court
repudiated the rule of disability altogether and held that children
could sue their parents for personal torts as they could strangers.
However, in several cases the courts have qualified and limited the
application of the rule. Thus, where the tort has been alleged to be
malicious or wilful in nature, there has been a tendency to allow
the bringing of an action. 84 The presence of some additional relationship out of which the tort arose, or the fact that the tort arose out of
the business activities of the parent has also led some courts to
allow the bringing of an action. Particularly significant is the case
of Borst v. Borst,85 a Washington case, where the court analyzed most
of the various considerations of policy which have been urged in
support of the rule and held that it should apply only when the tort
arises out of the exercise of parental duties. In so holding the court
expressly disapproved its former decisions.
In many, if not most of the states, however, the rule of absolute
disability appears to be well entrenched, particularly with respect
to actions based upon negligence.
2. Parent v. Child
In.
the relatively few reported cases involving actions by a parent
against ,his child for personal torts, the courts have almost uniformly
held that no such action could be maintained.86 In support of this
81. Brumfield v. Brumfield, 194 Va. 577, 74 S.E. 2d 170 (1953).

82. Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832, 114 S.E.2d 468 (1938); Luster v. Luster,
299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938); Reingold v. Reingold, 115 N.J.L. 532, 181

Atl. 153 (1935).

83. Reynolds v. Maramorosch, 208 Misc. 626, 144 N.Y.S.2d 900 '(Sup. Ct.

1955); Nudd v. Matsoukas, supra note 80.
84. See, e.g., Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill. 2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956).
85. 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952).
86. Shaker v. Shaker, 129 Conn. 518, 29 A.2d 765 (1942); Thompson v.
Thompson, 264 S.W.2d 667 (Ky. 1954); Schneider v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18,
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conclusion, the courts have relied primarily upon the policy of
protecting family harmony and the analogous rule barring actions
for personal tort -by a child against his parent. In addition the
courts have pointed out that the parent is the natural guardian of
the child and that he should not be allowed to assume the inconsistent
87
position of attempting to recover damages from the child.
All of the reported cases have involved actions based upon the
alleged negligent operation of automobiles and it may be assumed
that the children involved were protected by liability insurance, but
the courts have not found the presence of such insurance to be a
material factor.
None of the reported cases have involved malicious, wilful, or
intentional torts. Nor have the courts considered what, if any, effect
should be given the presence of some additional relationship between
the parties.
There seems to be no doubt but that a parent can bring an action
for personal tort- against a child who has been fully emancipated. 88
C. Actions Between Other Members
of the Family Group
The courts, in the few reported cases involving the point, have allowed actions for personal torts to be maintained between other members of the family group. Thus, actions between siblings have been
allowed, 89 an infant has been allowed to recover against his grandmother,90 as well as a father-in-law against his son-in-law.91
In support of their decisions in these cases, the courts have relied
strongly on the general principle that the law will not suffer a wrong
without a remedy, have discounted alleged dangers to domestic
harmony as well as any dangers of fraud and collusion, and have also
pointed out that in these relations there are no such recognized
legal rights and duties as exist between the husband and wife and
parent and child. 92
152 Atl. 498 (1930); Rines v. Rines, 97 N.H. 55, 80 A.2d 497 (1951) (applied
law of Maine); Boehm v. C. M. Gridley & Sons, 187 Misc. 113 63 N.Y.S.2d
587 (Sup. Ct. 1956); Duffy v. Duffy, 117 Pa. Super. 500, 178 Atl. 165 (1935);
Turner v. Carter, 169 Tenn. 553, 89 S.W.2d 751 (1936); Fidelity Say. Bank v.
Aulik, 252 Wis. 602, 32 N.W.2d 613 (1948). Contra, Wells v. Wells, 48 S.W.2d
109 (Mo. App. 1932).
87. Shaker v. Shaker, 129 Conn. 518, 29 A.2d 765 (1942); Schneider v.
Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 152 Atl. 498 (1930).
88. Taylor v. Taylor, 360 Mo. 994, 232 S.W.2d 382 (1950); Cafaro v. Cafaro,
14 N.J. Misc. 331, 184 Atl. 779 (Sup. Ct. 1936); Crosby v. Crosby, 230 App.
Div. 651, 246 N.Y. Supp. 384 (3d Dep't 1930); Lo Galbo v. Lo Galbo, 138 Misc.
485, 246 N.Y. Supp. 565 (Sup. Ct. 1930).

89. Emery v. Emery, 289 P.2d 218 (Cal. 1955); Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N.Y. 106,
22 N.E.2d 254 (1939); Bielke v. Knaack, 207 Wis. 490, 242 N.W. 176 (1932).
Detwiler v. Detwiler, 162 Pa. Super. 383, 57 A.2d 426 (1948).
See
90.also
Spaulding v. Mineah, 264 N.Y. 589, 191 N.E. 578 (1934).
91. Hamburger v. Katz, 10 La. App. 215, 120 So. 391 (1928).
92. Emery v. Emery, 289 P.2d 218 (Cal. 1955); Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N.Y.
106, 22 N.E.2d 254 (1939).
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Ill. ANALYSIS AND SUGGESTIONS
A review of the cases discloses confusion compounded. Vhile tentative movements towards the formulation of a consistent and workable
rule have indeed been made, no rule has yet been formulated which
adequately secures the interests involved. Such a situation is to be
expected when one considers that the changed conditions of society
and the changed conceptions of the family have been present for
only a relatively few years.
A principal source of confusion, howeveri has been the failure to
analyze the nature of the problem. For, actually, the ultimate problem
of whether or not recovery should be allowed in such actions involves
two distinct questions: first, whether the defendant has breached a
legal duty to the plaintiff which should give rise to a right of compensation; and second, whether the enforcement of such a right should
be denied because such enforcement itself would violate some greater
social interest.
The answer to both questions involves the reconciliation of those social interests fundamental to the law of torts with the facts of
93
family life and the social interests arising therefrom.
The basic problem is thus one which is present in the formulation
of any rule of law in that it involves the process of selecting from
all the complex and interwoven factors, interests, principles and
values, those which seem to be in accordance with and in furtherance
of a general conception of justice. Inevitably, therefore, any solution
will be based upon a priori conceptions of general postulates of
justice and social policy and deductions therefrom.
A. The Presence of a Legal Duty
The basic assumption of the analysis which follows is that the
interest of society in the prevention of personal injuries and the compensation of injured persons gives rise to a general social interest
requiring the imposition of a legal duty on all persons to refrain from
injuring others, unless the imposition of such a duty would violate
93. "When it comes to weighing or valuing claims or demands with respect
to other claims or demands, we must be careful to compare them on the same
plane. If we put one as an individual interest and the other as a social interest we may decide the question in advance in our way of putting it. For
example, in the 'truck act' cases one may think of the claim of the employer
to make contracts freely as an individual interest of substance. In that event,
we might weigh it with the claim of the employee not to be coerced by economic pressure into making contracts to take his pay in orders on a company
store, thought of as an individual interest of personality. If we think of either
in terms of a policy we must think of the other in the same terms. If we think
of the employee's claim in terms of a policy of assuring a minimum or a
standard human life, we must think of the employer's claim in terms of a
policy of upholding and enforcing contracts. If the one is thought of as a right
and the other as a policy, or if the one is thought of as an individual interest
and the other as a social interest, our way of stating the question may leave
nothing to decide." Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARv. L. REv. 1, 2
(1943).
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some greater and more valuable social interest. With respect to such
latter interests, it is also assumed that the interest of society in protecting the intimacy of family life free from unnecessary and inhibiting
fears and restraints, as well as the interest of society in preserving
the attitude of togetherness which is essential to wholesome family life,
are greater and more valuable than the interest in imposing a duty
to refrain from injuring others.
The problem is thus to determine under what circumstances, if
any, the imposition of a legal duty to refrain from injuring other
members of the family group will violate the greater interest in protecting the basis of family existence.
Since the only basis for denying a duty to refrain from injuring
others in such cases is the presence of the family relationship, the
most logical general classification of the possible fact situations is on
that basis; that is, to classify the possible actions into first, those actions arising out of acts directly attributable to the family relation,
and second, those actions arising out of acts directly attributable to
some other and additional relation.
1. Actions Arising Out of Acts or
Omissions Directly Attributable
to the Family Relation
The family group lives in intimate daily contact. As a result of that
intimacy there is infinitely more opportunity for injuries to be suffered
by members of the group as the result of their own acts or omissions
than is the case with strangers to the group.
Fathers romp with their children. Husbands and wives caress.
Brothers and sisters play and sometimes come to blows. Clearly no
legal duty to refrain from injuring the other members of the family
should or can arise in these situations.
In addition, by virtue of this intimacy, and by reason of the shortcomings of all humans, the home is of necessity a somewhat dangerous
place for its inhabitants. Children will leave their roller skates on
the front porch, and fathers will forget to fix the broken stairs.
Moreover, the lack of knowledge or of means may also create unsafe conditions in the home. The nature of family life, therefore,
compels the members of the family group to accept the risks inherent
in such circumstances.
The interests of society in the preservation of family life free
from fears and inhibitions precludes the imposition of a legal duty to
refrain from injuring other members of the family group by such
acts or omissions, and thus outweighs the social interests in the imposition of a legal duty to refrain from injuring the other members of
the family group in such circumstances.
Clearly then, actions based upon mere negligence which arise out of
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acts or omissions which are directly attributable to the existence of
the family relation should not be allowed.
The nature of family life, however, does not compel the members of
the family to accept the risk of wilful and malicious acts of other
members of the family group. Daughters should not be compelled
to accept rape committed by their fathers. Nor should wives be
compelled to accept brutal beatings at the hands of their husbands.
The nature of such wrongs is such as to show a disregard of the
family relation. There is nothing in the family relation which should
preclude the imposition of a legal duty on all members of the family
group to refrain from wilfully, wantonly, or maliciously injuring other
members of the group.
The interests of society in the prevention of personal injury and
the compensation of injured persons requires the imposition of a
legal duty on all members of the family group to refrain from wilfully, wantonly, and maliciously injuring other members of the
group.
The parental discipline cases have already shown a tendency to
develop along these lines. Certainly a parent is responsible for the
discipline of his child and has a legal as well as moral right, and
at least a moral duty, to correct and punish the child. But that right
should be limited, as indeed it has been in some cases, to the infliction
of reasonable punishment. The parent should be under a legal duty
to refrain from abusing and cruelly and maliciously punishing his
child.
2. Actions Arising Out of Acts or
Omissions Directly Attributable
to Some Other or Additional Relation
In the nature of modern life, the various members may assume
other roles than those predicated on their family relation-for example, carrier and passenger, master and servant, or one member of
the family may be an invitee or customer in the other's place of business.
When a member of the family group is engaged in activities which
are separate from the home and the life of the family as such, he
should owe the same duties to the members of his family as he does
to persons generally. The imposition of a legal duty in such circumstances to treat members of the family group in the same way as
other persons will not violate the social interest in preserving the
intimacy of family life free from fears and inhibitions. When the
existence of the family relation is logically irrelevant, it should not
effect the duties imposed for the protection of persons generally.
Thus, when the act or omission is not directly attributable to the
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existence of the family relation, but rather to some other relation
or circumstance, it should not affect the presence of the duties imposed by law with respect to personal injuries, regardless of the
nature of the act or omission.
3. Difficulties in Classification
The above classification is logically sound, but it is admittedly subject to some practical difficulty in application. As is true of most
general schemes of classification, there are border-line cases in which
logical arguments can be made for placing the particular case in either
class.
While, in general in modern society, the business activities of the
members of the family group are more or less completely separate
from the family activities as such, there are nevertheless many instances where it is difficult to distinguish between the two. For example, it would be difficult to distinguish between the activities of
the typical farm family, where the range of family activities extends
beyond the home itself into the varied activities of a farming enterprise.
The automobile cases also present some very real difficulties. The
family car is just as integral a part of family existence as the home
itself. Thus it logically follows that when the injury complained of
results from the joint participation of both parties in the use of the
family car for a family purpose there should be no right to compensation and no corresponding duty. Such would be true in the ordinary
case where the injured person is a passenger in the family car.
For in such a case, the injury is directly attributable to the existence
of the family relation, just as much as in the case of an accident in the
home itself. However, there will be instances where the injury complained of will not be directly attributable to the existence of the
family relation, even though the family car is involved; for example, in a case where the driver of a family car jumps the curb on a
busy street and hits a pedestrian who happens to be a member of his
family.
In any case, however, the nature of the duty imposed depends upon
the nature of the risk created by the particular act or omission. If
the risk created is peculiar to members of the family group-that is,
such a risk that only a member of the family group is apt to be exposed to it, then no legal duty to avoid it should be imposed for such
risks arise out of the nature of family life itself. But if the risk
created is common to the public at large-that is, such a risk that
any person is apt to be exposed to it, then a legal duty to avoid
it should be imposed.
Of course, as has already been shown, when the injury complained
of is the result of a malicious, wilful, or wanton act-for example, in a
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case where a drunken father compels his child to ride with him over
a dangerous road, the breach of a legal duty should be found; the
acts in such cases do not arise out of the nature of family life itself
but rather are in contradiction to its basic nature and purpose.
4. Effect of the Termination of the Family Relation
Since the only logical basis for refusing to impose the general duty
to refrain from injuring others on members of the family group in
their relations within the group is the existence of the family relation
itself and the sharing of the intimacy of that relation, it follows that
when the relation is terminated the exception to the general legal duty
is also terminated. Thus, when a child is fully emancipated and
living apart from the family group, he should have the same rights
and the other members of the family group should have the same
duties as in the case of strangers to the family group. So when the
husband and wife are not living together as such, or are divorced,
their legal rights and duties as to personal torts should be the
same as those between strangers.
Of course, the presence of a legal duty should be determined as
of the time of the act or omission complained of, and subsequent
changes in the parties' relations should not affect the question of
whether such a duty was present at that time.
Effect of Other Factors.-The various other considerations of policy
which have influenced the course of the decisions with respect to
whether such actions should be allowed-the presence of insurance,
the availability of other remedies, the difficulty in distributing the
proceeds of any recovery, the danger to the happy home-are irrelevant in the determination of the existence of a legal duty.
5. The Effect of Allowing Actions
for Personal Torts Between Members of the Family Group.
The second basic question in determining whether recovery should
be allowed in actions for personal torts between members of the
family group is whether the enforcement of such a right through the
process of litigation will violate some social interest which is of greater
value than the general social interest in the prevention of personal
injuries and the compensation of injured persons.
The basic conception of the analysis which follows is that the
interest of society in protecting the intimacy of family life and the
interest in preserving the attitude of togetherness which is essential
to wholesome family life are greater and more valuable than theinterest in requiring compensation for injuries to the person.
The problem is then to determine under what circumstances, if
any, the effect of the enforcement of compensation for personal torts
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will violate the greater interest in protecting the basis of family
existence.
The Nature of the Act or Omission.-In this aspect of the general
subject, the question involves the effect of the litigation itself. Thus,
the nature of the act or omission is irrelevant and immaterial. For
if the effect of litigation between members of the family group will
be detrimental to the social interest in preserving the basis of family
existence, it will be equally as detrimental whether the action is
based upon negligence or upon a wilful and malicious act, or whether
the action is based upon an act or omission directly attributable to the
existence of the family relation or otherwise.
Effect of Time of Act or Omission and Time of Litigation.-Since
the only basis for denying a recovery in this aspect of the matter is
the adverse effect of the litigation itself on the family relation, the
existence of the relation at the time of the act or omission is immaterial. It is only when the relation is in existence, and thus subject
to possible adverse effect at the time of the litigation, that considerations of policy in this regard can be relevant or material.
Effect of Such Litigation on Family Life.-As numerous authorities
have pointed out in answering the contention that the allowance of
such litigation would disrupt the harmonious relations which should
exist within the family, such actions will be brought in only two
circumstances: either the happy home will have already been disrupted, either by the act complained of or from some other cause,
in which case the litigation cannot be said to affect the desired
harmonious relations; or the parties will be in accord that the
litigation is to their mutual benefit, in which case it can hardly be
said to have a disruptive influence. Therefore, the social interest in
protecting the basis of family existence will not be violated by the
allowance of litigation between the members of the family group,
regardless of the nature of that litigation.
Other Policy Considerations.-The availability of such other remedies as habeas corpus, divorce, child custody proceedings, and the
remedies of the criminal law should not affect the availability of
a remedy in tort for personal injuries. Patently, such remedies do not
adequately secure the social interest in the right of injured persons
to compensation. Such proceedings have an entirely different purpose, involve different interests and values, and thus can have no
relation to the allowance of actions for personal torts.
Nor should the presence of liability insurance be considered material. On the one hand, some authorities have contended that the
presence of liability insurance should be a factor supporting the allowance of such actions on the premise that since the insurance company
is the interested party defendant no harm can be caused the family,
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and the insurance company should bear the responsibility in actions
between members of the family as in other actions. But the courts
have generally, and quite properly, rejected these contentions as
being out of harmony with the basic nature and purpose of liability
insurance. Generally, the insurance company contracts to assume
liability only insofar as the insured himself may be liable. If a
person desires accident insurance for himself and his family such
policies may be obtained. From the company's standpoint, however,
it might be well to offer such accident coverage as an integral part
of the regular liability policy, particularly in automobile liability
policies.
On the other hand, the refusal to allow such actions on the ground
that they may be collusive and fraudulent is equally untenable.
Generally, the insurance company contracts to assume liability in all
cases within the terms of the policy. If the action comes within the
terms of the policy, the company should not be allowed to escape
liability in a particular case on the ground that such cases in general
offer an opportunity for collusion. Fraud and collusion are always
good defenses when proven; but the burden or proving such matters
should be on the party alleging them, as it generally is. There certainly should be no presumption of fraud in such cases.
The difficulty in apportioning recoveries in such cases so that the
wrongdoer does not profit from his own wrong does present some practical problems, but as the cases allowing such recoveries in actions
for personal torts as well as in property and contract actions between
members of the family have shown, these problems are not unsolvable. Their presence is not a sufficient basis for denying relief
if it should otherwise be granted.
IV. CONCLUSION
Neither a rule absolutely denying liability in all cases of personal
torts between members of a family, nor a rule allowing the members
of a family to recover in all such cases as in actions between strangers,
adequately secures the social interests involved.
The basis of any satisfactory exception to the general rules of the
law of personal torts must rest on the' nature of family existence.
Accordingly, the following deductions are suggested as logically sound
and as effectively expressing and securing the social interests involved:
1. In any case where the action is based upon an act or omission
not directly attributable to the existence of the family relation, but
rather attributable to some other or additional relation, the action
should be allowed.
2. In any case where the action is based upon some wilful, malicious,
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or wanton act or omission, the action should be allowed.
3. In any case where the action is based upon some mere negligent
act or omission which is directly attributable to the existence of the
family relation, it should not be allowed.
Since these principles are based upon deductions from a conception
of the necessary intimacy of family life, the risks inherent therein,
and the social interests arising therefrom, they should be applied
not merely on the basis of the existence of some blood or marital
relation, but rather on the basis of a factual determination as to
whether the parties to the particular action were at the time of the
act or omission complained of actually sharing in the normal intimacy
of family life.
The present unsatisfactory rules are generally based either on common-law principles or conceptions of public policy. Even in the
case of actions between husband and wife, the established rules are
not primarily or necessarily derived from statutory sources. In these
circumstances the courts have the power to adopt the principles herein
suggested, "The common law is not rigid and inflexible, a thing dead
to all surrounding and changing conditions, it does expand with
reason. The common law is not a compendium of mechanical rules,
written in fixed and indelible characters, but a living organism which
grows and moves in response to the larger and fuller development of
the nation."' '
It would be an abdication of the judicial function for the courts to
refuse to reconsider the old and unsatisfactory rules. 95 The present

rules were created by the courts and it is for them to make such
modifications as may be necessary to secure the social interests involved.
94. Openheim v. Kridel, 236 N.Y. 156, 164, 140 N.E. 227, 230 (1923).
95. Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149 (1952).

